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In  March  of  2018,  North  Korean  leader  Kim  Jong-un  joined  Chinese  President  Xi  Jinping  
in  Beijing  for  a  secretive  four-day  meeting,  marking  Kim’s  first  foreign  trip  and  first  meeting  
with  another  head  of  state  since  taking  power  in  2011.  It  was  three  weeks  after  U.S.  President  
Donald  Trump  had  announced  his  intention  to  meet  with  Kim,  and  China,  it  seemed,  wanted  to  
make  sure  it  was  involved.  There  was  much  speculation  over  what  exactly  happened  during  this  
meeting  —  foreign  news  media  could  only  base  their  coverage  off  accounts  by  Xinhua,  China’s  
state-run  news  agency,  or  North  Korean  state  media. 1   Nonetheless,  scholars  observed  the  
extensive  Chinese  media  coverage  after  the  visit  and  the  “overwhelmingly  positive  read-out  in  
China’s  official  media,”  coming  to  a  few  conclusions:  “Chinese  leaders  appear  to  want  to  signal  
to  a  domestic  and  international  audience  that:  1)  Beijing  and  Pyongyang  each  see  it  as  in  their  
interests  to  repair  relations,  2)  Beijing  is  determined  to  play  a  decisive  role  in  any  diplomatic  
process  for  dealing  with  the  Korean  Peninsula,  and  3)  Xi  is  the  elder  statesman  in  his  relationship  
with  Kim.” 2    
Over  the  next  15  months,  Kim  would  meet  with  Xi  four  more  times.  He  would  also  meet  
with  Trump  four  times,  making  Trump  the  first  U.S.  president  to  ever  meet  with  a  North  Korean  
head  of  state  and  the  first  sitting  U.S.  president  to  set  foot  in  North  Korea.  During  this  time,  Kim  
would  also  meet  with  South  Korean  president  Moon  Jae-in.  Of  course,  this  is  not  the  first  time  
this  traditionally  isolated  state  has  engaged  in  diplomacy  with  other  countries.  These  two  years,  
1  Steven  Lee  Myers  and  Jane  Perlez,  “Kim  Jong-un  Met  With  Xi  Jinping  in  Secret  Beijing  Visit,”  The  New  
York  Times ,  March  27,  2018,  
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/world/asia/kim-jong-un-china-north-korea.html .  
2  Ryan  Hass,  “What  we  know—and  don’t—about  the  meeting  between  Kim  Jong-un  and  Xi  Jinping,”  The  
Brookings  Institution ,  March  28,  2018,  
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/03/28/what-we-know-and-dont-about-the-meeting- 
between-kim-jong-un-and-xi-jinping/ .   
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however,  marked  an  unprecedented  flurry  of  activity  that  put  Kim  in  the  media  spotlight  and  left  
outside  observers  furiously  predicting  what  would  happen  next.  
Direct  meetings  between  state  leaders  have  been  a  part  of  foreign  policy  for  centuries,  but  
only  became  popularized  in  the  late  20th  century  as  logistical  barriers  to  meeting  in  person  
disappeared  and  international  organizations  flourished. 3   In  his  comprehensive  review  of  the  
practice,  David  Dunn  defines  summitry  as  “the  meeting  of  political  leaders  for  official  purposes,  
an  activity  which  constitutes  diplomacy  at  the  highest  level.” 4   However,  it  has  not  been  often  
used  with  North  Korea  due  to  the  reluctance  of  the  U.S.  and  many  in  the  international  
community  to  legitimize  its  totalitarian  regime,  making  the  sudden  succession  of  meetings  
between  North  Korea  and  three  of  its  most  intimately  involved  countries  worthy  of  attention.  
Even  more  interesting  is  the  minimal  amount  of  planning  and  preparation  for  some  of  the  
meetings  between  Trump  and  Kim,  with  the  June  30,  2019  meeting  seemingly  initiated  by  a  
tweet  by  Trump  merely  two  days  prior. 5   Before  that,  the  last  high-profile  meeting  was  Secretary  
of  State  Madeleine  Albright’s  visit  to  Pyongyang  at  the  end  of  the  Clinton  administration  in  
2001,  where  she  met  with  Kim  Jong-il  to  convince  him  to  halt  his  missile  testing.  North  Korea  
had  wanted  Clinton  to  visit  as  well,  but  Clinton’s  attention  was  diverted  to  the  Middle  East  to  
negotiate  an  Israel-Palestine  peace  deal  and  his  time  ran  out.  
  
Leading  Up  to  the  Summits  
During  Kim’s  time  in  power,  he  has  pushed  for  sweeping  economic  and  agricultural  
reforms,  pivoting  away  from  his  father’s  military-first  policy.  However,  the  continued  emphasis  
3  J.  Robert  Schaetzel  and  H.  B.  Malmgren,  “Talking  Heads,”  Foreign  Policy ,  no.  39  (1980):  131,  
https://doi.org/10.2307/1148416 .  
4  David  H.  Dunn,  Diplomacy  at  the  Highest  Level:  The  Evolution  of  International  Summitry  (Springer,  
2016):  20.  
5  Donald  Trump,  Twitter  Post,  June  28,  2019,  3:51  P.M.,  
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1144740178948493314?s=20 .   
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on  the  “ byungjin”  (parallel  development)  policy  of  economic  and  nuclear  development  —  first  
announced  in  a  March  2013  plenary  session  —  has  not  disappeared.  This  strategy  means  “a  
legitimate  guideline  that  realizes  the  achievements  of  ‘constructing  a  socialist  strong  and  
prosperous  nation’  through  strengthening  deterrence  and  speeding  up  economic  construction.” 6   
One  of  the  tasks  laid  out  was  “to  legally  affirm  North  Korea’s  nuclear  power  status,  and  to  
expand  and  bolster  nuclear  forces  in  both  quality  and  quantity  until  the  world  is  denuclearized.”  
Economic  growth  and  nuclear  development;  one  would  not  happen  at  the  expense  of  the  other,  
even  as  the  world  tries  to  convince  Kim  otherwise.  North  Korea  intends  to  continue  building  up  
its  nuclear  armory  for  self-defense  “until  the  world  denuclearizes.” 7   
The  year  2017  was  marked  by  near-monthly  missile  launches  by  North  Korea,  indicating  
rapid  and  significant  developments  in  its  nuclear  program.  This  was  met  with  a  strong  reaction  
from  the  international  community  in  the  form  of  UN  Resolutions  2371  and  2375,  which  targeted  
its  principal  exports,  such  as  coal,  iron,  seafood,  and  textiles.  In  response,  North  Korea  said  it  
would  “make  the  U.S.  pay  dearly  for  all  the  heinous  crime  it  commits  against  the  state  and  
people  of  this  country.” 8   Trump  threatened  North  Korea  with  “fire  and  fury,”  calling  Kim  a  “little  
rocket  man,”  and  Kim  in  turn  called  him  a  “mentally  deranged  U.S.  dotard.”  
Then,  Kim  pivoted.  At  the  beginning  of  2018,  Kim  took  a  conciliatory  tone  toward  South  
Korea  in  his  traditional  New  Year’s  speech.  In  February  2018,  North  Korea  indicated  to  South  
Korea  that  it  was  willing  to  talk  to  the  U.S.  and  halt  missile  testing  while  engaging  in  dialogue  
with  South  Korea. 9   When  South  Korean  national  security  chief  Chung  Eui-yong  informed  Trump  
6  “The  full  text  of  Kim  Jong-un’s  remarks  at  the  plenary  session  of  the  Party  Central  Committee,”  Korean  
Central  News  Agency,  April  1,  2013.  
7  Seong-Whun  Cheon,  “The  Kim  Jong-un  Regime’s  ‘Byungjin’  (Parallel  Development)  Policy  of  Economy  
and  Nuclear  Weapons  and  the  ‘April  1st  Nuclearization  Law’,”  Korea  Institute  for  National  Unification,  4,  
https://repo.kinu.or.kr/bitstream/2015.oak/2227/1/0001458456.pdf.  
8  “Statement  of  DPRK  Government,”  Korean  Central  News  Agency,  Aug.  7,  2017.  
9  Joshua  Berlinger  et.  al,  “North  Korea  willing  to  talk  to  US  about  giving  up  nuclear  weapons,  Seoul  says,”  
CNN,  March  7,  2018,  https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/06/asia/north-korea-summit-intl/index.html .   
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that  Kim  had  expressed  a  desire  to  meet,  Trump  said  yes  —  to  the  surprise  and  skepticism  of  
many.  The  date  was  set  for  June  12  in  Singapore.  Trump  abruptly  pulled  out  of  the  meeting  May  
24  after  some  North  Korean  officials  disparaged  Vice  President  Mike  Pence,  but  he  quickly  
reinstated  the  meeting  a  week  later.  
  
Why  now?  
   
Putting  aside  Trump’s  unconventional  and  often  erratic  foreign  policy,  this  period  of  time  
represents  an  unprecedented  amount  of  engagement  and  dialogue  between  Kim  and  the  rest  of  
the  world.  In  general,  many  agree  that  Kim’s  engagement  in  summit  diplomacy  showed  his  
“commitment  to  shifting  the  country’s  focus  from  nuclear  to  economic  development”  and  North  
Korea’s  “desire  to  appear  as  a  normal  state.” 10   
North  Korea  has  long  sought  to  normalize  relations  with  the  U.S.,  prioritizing  a  guarantee  
of  national  sovereignty  and  the  preservation  of  the  Kim  family  regime.  The  U.S.’s  goal  has  
always  been  to  denuclearize  North  Korea  by  diplomatic  means,  with  varying  levels  of  
engagement  during  each  U.S.  administration.  South  Korean  policy  toward  North  Korea  has  
varied  between  administrations  as  well,  reaching  a  height  in  economic  engagement  and  friendly  
relations  during  the  Sunshine  Policy  of  President  Kim  Dae-jung’s  administration.  And  though  
China  opposes  North  Korea’s  nuclear  arms  build-up,  it  has  historically  prioritized  stability  in  the  
Korean  peninsula  and  limiting  U.S.  influence  in  East  Asia.  With  so  many  interests  involved,  
North  Korean  policy  has  always  been  difficult  to  coordinate.  
Until  2018,  however,  the  least  amount  of  diplomatic  engagement  has  happened  during  the  
Kim  regime  compared  to  his  predecessors.  Only  two  official  DPRK-U.S.  negotiations  occurred  
10  Gi-Wook  Shin  and  Rennie  J.  Moon,  “North  Korea  in  2018:  Kim’s  Summit  Diplomacy,”  Asian  Survey  59,  
no.  1  (February  2019):  43,  https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2019.59.1.35 .  
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between  December  2011  and  January  2017. 11   Xi  has  largely  ignored  Kim,  his  nuclear  activities  
making  him  more  a  liability  in  the  region  than  an  asset  for  China.  The  conservative  Park  
Geun-hye  administration  took  a  hardline  stance  against  North  Korea,  and  it  wasn’t  until  Moon  
Jae-in  came  into  office  in  2017  with  a  promise  to  return  to  the  Sunshine  Policy  that  tensions  
thawed  again.  
Some  have  speculated  that  economic  sanctions  by  the  international  community  were  a  
critical  reason  why  Kim  has  taken  a  sudden  interest  in  summit  diplomacy. 12   Though  sanctions  of  
varying  severity  have  been  in  place  for  years,  lack  of  cooperation  from  China  and  Russia  —  
North  Korea’s  primary  trade  partners  —  has  rendered  them  ineffective.  However,  China’s  
enforcement  of  sanctions  in  late  2017  and  early  2018,  a  result  of  frustration  with  North  Korea’s  
barrage  of  missile  tests  in  2017,  has  been  a  real  blow  to  North  Korea.  According  to  the  Bank  of  
Korea,  the  total  volume  of  trade  decreased  by  15%,  and  the  country’s  GDP  decreased  by  6.8%,  
the  smallest  growth  rate  since  1997. 13   China’s  imports  from  North  Korea  dropped  to  almost  zero  
by  the  beginning  of  2018,  though  exports  have  remained  consistent,  according  to  Chinese  trade  
data. 14   
Others  have  said  Kim  has  reached  a  “satisfactory  level  of  military  deterrence”  and  feels  
no  further  need  to  continue  developing  nuclear  weapons. 15   In  an  April  2018  plenary  meeting,  
Kim  declared  that  the  country  has  “perfectly  accomplished  the  great  historic  cause  of  building 
11  Lisa  Collins,  “25  Years  of  Negotiations  and  Provocations:  North  Korea  and  the  United  States,”  Beyond  
Parallel,  Center  for  Strategic  and  International  Studies ,  
https://beyondparallel.csis.org/25-years-of-negotiations-provocations/ .   
12  Joseph  DeThomas,  “Are  Sanctions  Part  of  the  Problem?”  38North ,  Sept.  13,  2018,  
https://www.38north.org/2018/09/jdethomas091318/#_ftn2 .   
13  “Gross  Domestic  Product  Estimates  for  North  Korea  in  2018,”  Press  Release,  Bank  of  Korea,  July  20,  
2018.   
14  Daniel  Wertz,  “China-North  Korea  Trade:  Parsing  the  Data,”  38North ,  Feb.  25,  2020,  
https://www.38north.org/2020/02/dwertz022520/ .   
15  Shin,  “North  Korea  in  2018,”  37.  
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the  state  nuclear  force.” 16   He  pledged  to  cease  nuclear  and  inter-continental  ballistic  missile  
testings  and  that  nuclear  weapons  would  never  be  used  against  another  country  unless  there  was  
nuclear  threat  and  provocation  against  the  DPRK  first.  From  then  on,  all  of  the  party  and  
country’s  efforts  would  be  focused  on  “socialist  economic  construction.” 17   
What  was  North  Korea  trying  to  accomplish  regarding  these  three  countries  at  their  
respective  meetings?  Though  there  are  no  government  documents  to  examine  or  officials  to  
interview,  we  can  base  our  assumptions  on  decades  of  negotiation  with  North  Korea  and  
previous  public  statements  by  the  government.  When  it  comes  to  exactly  what  happened  during  
those  meetings,  we  can  also  look  at  official  reports  from  North  Korean  news  agencies  for  more  
insight.   
  
The  Korean  Central  News  Agency  
The  Korean  Central  News  Agency  (KCNA),  the  official  news  agency  of  North  Korea,  
was  founded  in  December  1946.  In  January  1997,  it  launched  its  website  with  dispatches  
available  in  English.  It  provides  radio  and  television  broadcasts  as  well  as  reports  from  North  
Korean  newspapers  like  the  Rodong  Sinmun,  publishing  daily  news  stories  in  Korean,  English  
and  Spanish.  It  also  delivers  external  news  to  domestic  media,  producing  summaries  of  
international  and  inter-Korean  news  for  distribution  to  officials  and  to  Pyongyang-based  
embassies  and  international  organizations.  It  is  also  a  member  of  the  Organization  of  
Asia-Pacific  News  Agencies.  Journalists  at  KCNA  have  trained  overseas  with  Reuters  and  BBC.  
16  “3rd  Plenary  Meeting  of  7th  C.C.,  WPK  Held  in  Presence  of  Kim  Jong  Un,”  Korean  Central  News  
Agency ,  April  21,  2018.  
17  Ibid.  
8  
The  role  of  the  KCNA,  according  to  a  Marxist-Leninist  concept  of  the  press,  is  to  
function  as  “an  agitator,  a  propagandist,  and  an  organizer.” 18   Throughout  the  country’s  history, 
media  has  been  an  important  tool  for  spreading  socialist  thought  —  in  1995,  Kim  Jong-il  urged  
news  media  to  “intensify  their  functions  of  indoctrination  and  control  to  help  solidify  the  
country’s  regime.” 19   The  KCNA  is  a  subsidiary  organ  of  the  cabinet,  speaking  on  behalf  of  the  
Korean  Workers’  Party  and  the  DPRK  government,  and  is  administered  by  a  political  bureau.   
Foreign  news  media  has  periodically  been  allowed  into  North  Korea,  though  the  only  full  
time  foreign  correspondents  as  of  2019  were  from  Russia’s  TASS  news  agency;  China’s  People’s  
Daily,  China  Central  Television  (CCTV)  and  Xinhua  news  agency;  and  Cuba’s  Prensa  Latina. 20   
The  Associated  Press,  Agence-France  Presse  and  Kyodo  News  Agency  have  bureaus  in  
Pyongyang,  though  none  have  a  full-time  presence  in  the  country.  Subsequently,  the  KCNA  is  
one  of  few  easily  accessible  sources  of  information  about  North  Korea.  Summitry  especially  
entails  vast  media  attention,  enlarging  the  usual  sizes  of  international  and  domestic  audiences.  
Especially  for  the  more  secretive  meetings  that  took  place  in  China  and  North  Korea,  the  KCNA  
was  a  primary  source  of  information  for  external  news  outlets  seeking  to  report  on  the  course  of  
events.  
This  study  attempts  to  answer  the  question,  how  does  English-language  North  Korean  
state  media  coverage  of  the  2018-2019  summits  that  took  place  between  Kim  Jong-un,  Xi  
Jinping  and  Donald  Trump  reflect  North  Korea’s  foreign  policy  goals  and  stances  toward  the  
respective  countries?  In  the  next  section,  we  will  look  at  previous  analyses  of  North  Korean  state  
18  Shelton  A.  Gunaratne,  ed.,  Handbook  of  the  media  in  Asia ,  (New  Delhi:  Sage  Publications,  2000),  588.  
19  Gunaratne,  Handbook ,  591.  
20  Oliver  Hotham,  “Havana’s  man  in  Pyongyang:  Cuba’s  first  full-time  North  Korea  correspondent,”  NK  
News ,  March  21,  2019,  
https://www.nknews.org/2019/03/havanas-man-in-pyongyang-cubas-first-full-time-north-korea-correspond 
ent/ .   
9  
media  and  what  they  have  revealed  about  how  the  country  employs  specific  rhetoric  in  their  
news  coverage.  
  
Previous  Research  on  North  Korean  Media  
  
Much  of  the  research  on  North  Korea,  especially  in  the  history  discipline,  has  relied  on  
external  documents,  such  as  those  that  were  declassified  after  the  fall  of  the  Soviet  Union.  Due  to  
the  limited  amount  of  information  and  authoritative  documents  on  North  Korea  that  actually  
originate  from  the  country,  many  scholars  have  also  made  extensive  use  of  defector  interviews  as  
well  as  KCNA  coverage  to  conduct  empirical  research  on  North  Korea.  Many  humanitarian  
organizations  have  had  extensive  access  in  North  Korea  as  well,  though  they  do  not  offer  their  
information  freely  as  to  not  jeopardize  their  presence  in  the  country  and  to  protect  their  sources.  
Timothy  Rich  has  done  extensive  research  involving  analysis  of  English-language  North  
Korean  media.  In  a  2010  study  analyzing  all  KCNA  daily  reports  in  2010,  Rich  found  a  strong  
association  between  the  U.S.  and  nuclear  issues  in  contrast  with  the  other  countries  at  the  Six  
Party  talks. 21   His  2012  study  then  looked  at  how  references  to  Kim  Il-sung  and  Kim  Jong-il  
corresponded  with  certain  political  and  economic  rhetoric.  He  uses  corpus  frequencies  and  
descriptive  statistics  to  look  at  explicit  references  to  topics  such  as  “military,  songun  politics,  
economics,  anti-imperialism,  juche,  nuclear  issues,  peace,  reunification,  revolutionary,  socialism,  
sovereignty,  and  war,”  finding  clear  distinctions  in  rhetoric  between  Kim  Il-sung  and  Kim  
Jong-il. 22   A  side  analysis  also  found  that  mentions  of  the  U.S.  fell  far  below  mentions  of  China  
and  Russia,  with  all  three  well  under  mentions  of  Japan  and  South  Korea.  In  his  2014  study,  he  
examines  North  Korea’s  nuclear  rhetoric  over  time  in  correlation  with  different  variables,  such  as  
21  Timothy  Rich,  “Deciphering  North  Korea's  Nuclear  Rhetoric:  An  Automated  Content  Analysis  of  KCNA  
News,”  Asian  Affairs  An  American  Review  39,  no.  2  (April  2012):  73-89.  
22  Timothy  Rich,  “Like  Father  Like  Son?  Correlates  of  Leadership  in  North  Korea’s  English  Language  
News,”  Korea  Observer  43,  no.  4  (Dec.  2012):  8.   
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conservative  or  liberal  United  States-South  Korea  presidential  dyads.  Through  analyzing  
coverage  from  1997-2012,  Rich’s  study  found  no  correlation  between  liberal  or  conservative  
leadership  and  nuclear  references,  rather  finding  that  nuclear  references  have  been  increasing  
steadily  over  time. 23   He  also  confirmed  again  that  like  in  his  2010  study,  nuclear  coverage  is  
strongly  connected  to  the  U.S.  Overall,  Rich  attempts  to  demonstrate  that  North  Korea’s  own  
English-language  materials  are  not  just  “boilerplate  propaganda,”  and  analysis  of  these  materials  
can  find  “intentional  variation”  that  may  provide  insight  into  the  inner  workings  of  the  DPRK. 24   
Research  by  Whang,  Lammbrau,  and  Joo  used  KCNA  coverage  to  deduce  North  Korea’s  
intentions  behind  its  nuclear  testing  program.  They  found  that  North  Korea’s  nuclear  rhetoric  
under  Kim  Jong-il  was  targeted  at  an  international  audience,  and  increased  usage  of  words  in  
KCNA  like  “suppression”  and  “downwithimperialism”  was  detected  directly  before  a  nuclear  
test. 25   Articles  emphasizing  North  Korea’s  ties  with  sympathetic  countries  like  China  and  Russia  
were  also  published.  In  contrast,  nuclear  rhetoric  under  Kim  Jong-un  targeted  a  domestic  
audience  through  references  to  his  father. 26   Whang,  Lammbrau,  and  Joo  used  supervised  machine  
learning  to  analyze  KCNA  coverage,  first  utilizing  the  machine  learning  process  on  a  training  
data  set  before  applying  it  to  a  test  data  set.  
A  comprehensive  analysis  of  42,000  KCNA  articles  —  covering  every  KCNA  article  
published  in  English  from  1997-2006  —  by  Mason  Richey  in  2019  focused  specifically  on  North  
Korea’s  “internationally-directed  belligerent  rhetoric.”  Richey  looked  for  correlations  between  
this  kind  of  rhetoric  and  various  events,  such  as  major  U.S.-led  military  exercises,  top-level  
23  Timothy  Rich,  “Propaganda  with  Purpose:  Uncovering  Patterns  in  North  Korean  Nuclear  Coverage,  
1997–2012,”  International  Relations  of  the  Asia-Pacific  14,  no.  3  (2014):  435.  
24  Ibid,  428.  
25  Taehee  Whang  et.  al.,  “Talking  to  Whom?  The  Changing  Audience  of  North  Korean  Nuclear  Tests:  
Changing  Audiences  for  North  Korean  Nuclear  Tests,”  Social  Science  Quarterly  98,  no.  3  (Sept.  2017):  
983-984.   
26  Ibid,  986.  
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North-South  Korea  summits,  Japan-North  Korea  negotiations,  and  North  Korean  provocations. 27   
However,  he  only  found  a  very  weak  pattern  of  more  inflammatory  rhetoric  during  times  of  
higher  tension  and  less  inflammatory  rhetoric  during  times  of  lower  tension,  leading  him  to  
conclude  that  North  Korea’s  belligerent  rhetoric  is  a  complex  “mixture  of  signal  and  noise.” 28   
Debin  Zhan’s  analysis  of  KCNA  and  Rodong  Sinmun  coverage  of  China,  Russia  and  the  
United  States  over  a  period  of  time  found  increasingly  negative  coverage  of  China,  leading  to  the  
conclusion  that  there  was  a  change  in  North  Korea’s  attitude  toward  China.  During  that  time,  the  
KCNA  published  many  more  articles  per  month  on  Russia  and  the  U.S.  Coverage  of  the  U.S.  
was  still  overwhelmingly  negative,  but  the  increase  in  the  number  of  articles  showed  North  
Korea’s  shift  to  prioritize  DPRK-Russia  and  DPRK-U.S  relations.  The  proportion  of  negative  
articles  per  month  stayed  the  same  for  Russia  and  the  U.S.  but  increased  significantly  for  China  
since  July  2014,  showing  the  KCNA  has  “engaged  China  as  a  quasi-hostile  country.” 29   Weiqi  
Zhang  and  Dmitry  Zinoviev’s  2018  study  took  a  comprehensive  look  at  coverage  of  China  as  
well,  but  used  certain  terms  classified  as  positive  and  negative  to  come  to  a  more  nuanced  
conclusion  about  North  Korea’s  attitude  toward  China.  Survival  in  the  international  sphere  meant  
a  need  to  preserve  good  relations  with  China,  but  at  the  same  time,  they  could  not  portray  too  
much  reliance  on  China  in  order  to  preserve  Kim  Jong-un’s  domestic  authority.  “To  achieve  this  
goal,  the  KCNA  under  Kim  Jong  Un  focused  on  promoting  ideological  sentiment,  such  as  the 
“traditional”  friendship  between  the  two  countries,  and  downplayed  China’s  role  in  the  North  
Korean  economy.” 30   
27  Mason  Richey,  “Cheap  Talk,  Costly  Talk,  Crazy  Talk:  Patterns  in  North  Korea’s  English  Language  
Propaganda,”  The  Pacific  Review  32,  no.  4  (July  4,  2019):  548.  
28  Ibid,  562.  
29  Debin  Zhan,  “Analysis  of  Changes  in  North  Korea’s  Cognition  of  China  
through  Its  Media  Coverage,”  The  Korean  Journal  of  Defense  Analysis  28,  no.  2  (June  2016):  212.  
30  Weiqi  Zhang  et.  al.,  “How  North  Korea  Views  China:  Quantitative  Analysis  of  Korean  Central  News  
Agency  Reports,”  The  Korean  Journal  of  Defense  Analysis  30,  no.  3  (Sept.  2018):  390.  
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Many  scholars  have  also  examined  media  coverage  of  the  Six  Party  Talks,  a  series  of  
meetings  between  North  Korea,  South  Korea,  China,  Japan,  Russia  and  the  United  States  from  
2003-2007.  Jang,  Hong  and  Frederick  focused  on  the  idea  of  media  framing,  looking  at  how  
China’s  Xinhua  news  agency  framed  the  talks  compared  to  KCNA.  They  coded  articles  based  on  
how  positive  or  negative  the  depictions  were  of  each  nation  involved,  as  well  as  three  national  
interest  frames:  cooperation,  conflict  and  threats. 31   This  was  done  by  two  independent  coders  
who  cross-examined  all  the  articles  for  inter-coder  reliability.  Their  approach  was  adopted  from  
Giffard  and  Rivenburgh  in  their  analysis  of  news  coverage  by  major  international  news  
organizations  —  AP,  IPS,  and  Reuters  —  of  six  major  U.N.  summits,  to  investigate  how  effective  
hosting  U.N.  summits  is  as  an  “image  management  strategy.” 32   
With  the  exception  of  Jang,  Hong  and  Frederick’s  study,  most  studies  that  have  analyzed  
North  Korean  media  coverage  have  examined  a  large  body  of  news  coverage  in  attempts  to  
uncover  overarching  patterns  in  rhetoric  related  to  the  Kim  leaders,  topic  and  country  
correlations,  or  changes  in  coverage  prompted  by  events.  Less  research  has  been  done  on  how  
North  Korean  media  might  cover  specific  events,  especially  ones  that  Western  media  have  little  
to  no  access  to.  Though  meetings  in  neutral  locations  such  as  the  Joint  Security  Area,  Hanoi  and  
Singapore  were  more  accessible  for  international  press,  meetings  that  took  place  in  China  —  
often  without  warning  —  and  North  Korea  were  less  so.  In  those  cases,  sources  like  the  KCNA  
can  be  important  in  shaping  the  outside  world’s  perception  of  those  meetings.  
31  Won  Yong  Jang  et.  al.,  “The  Framing  of  the  North  Korean  Six-Party  Talks  by  Chinese  and  North  Korean  
News  Agencies:  Communist  Propaganda  and  National  Interests,”  Media  International  Australia  154,  no.  1  
(February  1,  2015):  46.  
32  C.  Anthony  Giffard  et.  al.,  “News  Agencies,  National  Images,  and  Global  Media  Events,”  Journalism  &  
Mass  Communication  Quarterly  77,  no.  1  (March  1,  2000):  9.  
13  
This  study  theorizes  the  following:  State  media  of  authoritarian  governments  such  as  
North  Korea,  when  covering  news  of  diplomatic  summits,  will  include  different  language,  
themes  or  topics  that  reflect  the  country’s  negotiation  position  and  goals.   
  
To  examine  this  theory,  each  country  will  be  analyzed  against  the  following  hypotheses:   
  
News  articles  about  meetings  between  Kim  and  Xi  will  emphasize  China  and  North  
Korea’s  long-standing  friendship  and  cooperation.  
  
News  articles  about  meetings  between  Kim  and  Moon  will  emphasize  economic  
cooperation  and  peace  on  the  Korean  peninsula.  
  
News  articles  about  meetings  between  Kim  and  Trump  will  emphasize  denuclearization  
and  a  normalization  of  DPRK-U.S.  relations.  
  
  
Data  and  Methodology  
  
Interpreting  possible  foreign  policy  goals  expressed  through  North  Korea’s  media  
coverage  requires  a  methodology  that  both  allows  for  interpretation  of  public  statements  that  
may  have  changing  underlying  meanings  depending  on  the  context  and  a  quantitative  look  at  the  
language  used  to  look  at  which  topics  may  have  been  emphasized.  Consequently,  this  paper  uses  
a  software-assisted  discourse  analysis  that  is  often  used  to  analyze  media  discourses  to  look  at  
the  context  of  language  used  as  well  as  gather  quantitative  data  on  topics  or  themes  discussed.  
This  paper  compiles  and  examines  North  Korean  state  media  coverage  of  summits  
between  Kim  Jong-un  and  other  state  leaders  over  the  course  of  2018  and  2019  to  come  to  an  
understanding  about  how  North  Korea  utilizes  state  media  in  foreign  policy,  and  what  foreign  
policy  goals  can  be  derived  from  the  media  coverage  during  that  time  period.  I  examined  a  total  
of  11  meetings  that  took  place  between  Kim  and  Trump,  Kim  and  Moon,  and  Kim  and  Xi,  
beginning  with  Kim  and  Xi’s  March  25-28,  2018  meeting  and  ending  with  the  brief  meeting  
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between  Kim,  Moon  and  Trump  on  June  30,  2019.  Though  there  may  be  differences  in  KCNA’s  
Korean  and  English  coverage,  this  study  analyzes  the  English  content  produced  by  KCNA  itself  
rather  than  English  translations  of  its  Korean  coverage.  This  would  better  capture  North  Korea’s  
signaling  to  an  international  audience  for  foreign  policy  purposes,  as  its  English  coverage  is  
presumably  not  targeted  toward  its  domestic  audience.  I  ended  up  analyzing  80  articles,  applying  
codes  for  particular  phrases  and  topics.  
The  Rodong  Sinmun  newspaper  is  regarded  as  the  official  mouthpiece  of  the  Workers’  
Party  of  Korea,  often  announcing  official  policies  or  declarations.  Subsequently,  many  scholars  
have  also  used  content  analysis  of  the  Rodong  Sinmun  in  research,  or  a  combination  of  the  two.  
The  Rodong  Sinmun  website  contains  articles  in  both  Korean  and  English,  but  the  English  
articles  only  go  back  to  Jan.  2,  2018.  However,  because  KCNA  (kcna.co.jp)  contains  articles  
stretching  back  to  1997,  scholars  doing  research  that  requires  a  large  amount  of  data  over  time  
have  preferred  KCNA  over  Rodong  Sinmun.  All  the  articles  on  summits  used  in  this  particular  
research  project  can  be  found  on  both  KCNA  (kcna.co.jp)  and  the  Rodong  Sinmun,  but  only  a  
select  number  are  on  kcna.kp.   
My  approach  is  similar  to  that  of  Jang,  Hong,  and  Frederick,  where  two  human  coders  
read  through  all  of  the  articles  and  analyzed  the  articles  for  topic  framing  and  whether  it  gave  a  
favorable  or  unfavorable  depiction  of  the  countries  involved.  Due  to  resource  constraints,  I  was  
not  able  to  have  my  data  analyzed  by  multiple  researchers.  Though  analysis  solely  done  by  one  
human  (myself)  may  naturally  be  prone  to  errors  and  personal  biases,  this  problem  can  be  
minimized  by  establishing  clear  guidelines  and  explanations  for  when  to  apply  the  codes,  similar  
to  Giffard  and  Rivenburgh’s  approach  that  Jang,  Hong,  and  Frederick’s  approach  was  adopted  
from.  When  applying  codes,  I  noted  down  specific  words  and  phrases  as  indicators  for  when  to  
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apply  a  certain  code.  Re-reading  the  articles  several  times  and  re-checking  all  the  codes  can  
ensure  that  the  codes  created  while  analyzing  the  later  articles  will  be  applied  in  the  earlier  
articles  as  well.  Even  so,  the  problem  of  code  selection  bias  and  potentially  significant  omitted  
topics  or  phrases  that  I  did  not  code  for  exists  as  another  limitation  of  my  study.  Some  may  
question  why  I  did  not  treat  the  word  “comrade”  as  significant  or  why  I  included  “reconciliation”  
and  “unity”  within  the  umbrella  of  the  “cooperation”  code.  However,  these  choices  were  simply  
made  with  my  judgement  as  a  researcher  and  journalist  as  which  themes  may  be  most  important  
in  news  coverage  of  diplomatic  negotiations.  
I  did  not  directly  look  at  word  frequencies  or  perform  regression  analyses  between  
correlated  codes  because  of  the  vastly  smaller  body  of  data  I  examined  compared  to  other  
scholars.  The  total  number  of  references  coded  were  in  the  low  hundreds,  compared  to  the  
thousands  found  in  some  studies  like  Rich’s  analysis  of  nuclear  rhetoric.  This  is  a  limitation  of  
my  study,  as  it  is  difficult  to  come  to  definite  conclusions  on  North  Korea’s  relationships  with  the  
other  two  countries  based  on  statistically  significant  evidence.  
This  paper  also  does  not  use  machine  learning  techniques  or  sentiment  analysis  as  used  
by  some  other  scholars  analyzing  North  Korean  media.  Automated  analysis  techniques  may  be  
less  adept  at  distinguishing  when  a  certain  paragraph  or  phrase  is  irrelevant  and  should  not  be  
included  in  analysis.  Though  this  might  not  impact  the  results  when  working  with  a  large  body  of  
data,  it  is  significant  when  working  with  a  small  number  of  articles  covering  just  11  distinct  
events.  For  example,  if  an  article  describing  Kim  Jong-un’s  departure  included  North  Korean  
officials  warmly  sending  him  off  and  wishing  him  the  best,  the  positive  interaction  indicated  by  
the  word  “warmly”  should  not  be  included  because  it  has  no  relation  to  the  media’s  portrayal  of  
the  summit  events  themselves  or  the  opposing  country.   
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Unlike  some  other  studies,  my  analysis  did  not  involve  trying  to  determine  an  overall  
positive  or  negative  sentiment  toward  China  and  the  U.S.  As  the  purpose  of  summits  are  to  foster  
cooperation  and  oftentimes  produce  an  agreement  or  declaration,  it  is  unlikely  for  any  country  to  
be  producing  outrightly  negative  rhetoric  toward  the  country  they  are  engaging  with.  
Additionally,  during  the  period  of  time  these  meetings  were  held,  relations  between  North  Korea  
and  the  U.S.  went  from  highly  antagonistic  to  exchanging  words  of  praise. 33   Moon  was  also  
pursuing  a  strategy  focused  on  engagement  and  cooperation  reminiscent  of  the  Sunshine  Policy  
during  previous  South  Korean  presidents  Kim  Dae-jung  and  Roh  Moo-hyun’s  administrations.  
For  such  a  specific  and  nuanced  period  of  time,  a  positive  or  negative  frame  would  not  have  been  
particularly  useful.  
Finally,  my  study  does  not  include  other  KCNA  articles  published  about  the  summits  
during  the  same  time  frame  the  summit  articles  were  picked  out  from.  This  excludes  editorials,  
which  are  sometimes  used  to  express  stronger  opinions  —  often  belligerent  or  critical  ones  —  
and  may  have  included  insights  on  North  Korea’s  sentiment  toward  the  summit  or  certain  topics  
at  that  time.  This  was  mainly  due  to  resource  constraints  and  to  narrow  the  body  of  data  for  
examination.  However,  the  KCNA  is  ultimately  part  of  the  DPRK’s  propaganda  arm  and  any  
article,  regardless  of  whether  it  is  classified  as  a  news  article  or  editorial  piece,  only  portrays  
what  the  regime  chooses  to  reveal  to  the  world.  Even  an  analysis  of  just  the  articles  specifically  
covering  the  meetings  between  Kim  and  the  other  world  leaders  should  accurately  portray  North  
Korean  sentiment,  as  previous  scholars  have  discovered  in  their  studies.  
  
  
33  Aaron  Rupar.  Twitter  Post.  Sept.  29,  2018,  5:25  P.M.  
https://twitter.com/atrupar/status/1046194339301527552 .   
17  
Gathering  Articles  for  Analysis  
I  accessed  the  kcna.co.jp  website  using  a  VPN  with  the  location  set  to  Japan.  For  each  
meeting  date(s),  I  looked  at  the  KCNA  stories  starting  three  days  prior  to  the  start  date  and  
lasting  to  three  days  after  the  start  date,  downloading  any  article  related  to  the  summit  as  a  PDF.  
This  includes  describing  Kim  Jong-un  leaving  for  or  returning  from  the  summit,  activities  or  
events  attended  by  any  of  the  parties  involved,  as  well  as  speeches  given  by  any  of  the  parties.  
Though  there  may  be  articles  covering  the  meeting  that  exist  outside  the  three  days  before  and  
after  time  range  I  chose,  this  range  was  chosen  to  limit  the  scope  of  the  project,  as  well  as  reflect  
a  period  of  increased  international  attention  to  North  Korean  news  and  any  information  
accessible  by  the  public.   
Several  stories  were  excluded  from  my  analysis.  Articles  describing  Kim  Jong-un’s  visits  
with  the  Singaporean  Prime  Minister  and  the  Vietnamese  embassy  during  the  summits  with  
Trump  were  not  included,  as  well  as  an  article  describing  Kim’s  tour  around  Singapore.  The  
content  of  the  articles  had  no  relevance  as  they  made  no  mention  of  the  summit  itself.  However,  
they  were  included  in  numerical  article  counts,  as  they  are  still  part  of  the  overall  coverage  and  
media  attention  given  to  the  event.  An  increased  number  of  articles  published  by  KCNA  —  
essentially  a  propaganda  tool  for  the  DPRK  —  even  if  only  to  describe  Kim  waving  at  eagerly  
waiting  crowds,  can  show  more  emphasis  or  attention  sought  for  a  summit.  During  this  time  
period  of  meetings,  Kim  also  had  his  first  meeting  with  Russian  President  Vladimir  Putin  on  
April  25,  2019.  This  meeting  was  not  included  because  of  its  one-time  occurrence  and  scarce  
number  of  articles  for  adequate  analysis.  
After  identifying  and  downloading  the  articles  for  analysis,  I  imported  them  into  Atlas.ti,  
a  program  used  to  analyze  discourse  by  attaching  certain  “codes”  or  phrases  and  sentences  to  
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find  recurring  patterns  or  themes  within  a  set  of  data.  I  applied  these  codes  based  on  a  set  of  
definitions  I  created  (see  Appendix  1).  The  articles  were  sorted  by  world  leader;  one  meeting  that  
involved  both  Trump  and  Moon  was  included  in  the  Trump  category  because  it  was  an  
impromptu  meeting  initiated  by  Trump  (see  Appendix  2).  
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(15  article  
analyzed)  
Moon  Jae-in  
(34  articles  
analyzed)  
Xi  Jinping  
(32  articles  
analyzed)  
Totals  
(80  articles  
analyzed)  
Cooperation  4 28 11 43 
Denuclearization  10 13 2 25 
Familial  0 2 17 19 
Friendship  3 0 95 98 
Historic  26 43 6 75 
Metaphor  1 5 5 11 
Mutual  6 4 0 10 
New  Relations  7 0 0 7 
Overcoming  Challenges/Past  
Hostilities  
17 12 3 32 
Past  Leaders  0 0 14 14 
Peace  19 34 13 66 
Peninsula  18 26 20 64 
Positive  Interactions  5 33 49 87 
Reunification  0 13 0 13 
Success/Results  10 8 13 31 
Sincerity/Honesty  6 9 29 44 
Socialism  0 0 27 27 
Totals 132 230 304 666 
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Denuclearization  Familial  
  










Denuclearization  0 0 0 0 0 8 19 0 0 
Familial  0 0 7 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Friendship  0 7 0 0 10 2 5 0 0 
New  Relations  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Past  Leaders  
0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Peace  8 2 2 0 0 0 35 0 6 
Peninsula  19 0 5 0 0 35 0 0 4 
Positive  
Interactions  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Reunification  
0 0 0 0 0 6 4 0 0 
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Meetings  With  Xi  Jinping  
  
Consistent  with  expectations,  KCNA  articles  about  the  Kim-Xi  summits  strongly  
emphasized  the  long-standing  special  relationship  between  China  and  North  Korea.  The  
“friendship”  code  appeared  in  24  of  the  32  Xi  articles  and  was  applied  to  phrases  such  as  
“DPRK-China  friendship”  and  “friendly  relations.”  Of  the  98  instances  coded  with  “friendship,”  
95  were  found  in  Xi  articles  with  the  remaining  3  in  the  Trump  articles.  It  was  often  
accompanied  by  adjectives  like  “comradely,”  “deep  revolutionary,”  and   “traditional.”  It’s  
interesting  that  this  code  did  not  appear  in  any  of  the  articles  about  meetings  with  Moon,  and  
only  appeared  in  two  of  the  Trump  articles  in  the  form  of  the  phrase  “friendly  feelings.”  Based 
on  skimming  other  daily  KCNA  articles,  it  seems  that  friendship  is  a  term  that  is  reserved  for  
fellow  socialist  countries.   
In  the  same  vein,  18  of  the  20  mentions  of  “familial”  appeared  in  Xi  articles  with  the  
remaining  2  in  Moon  articles.  This  code  was  used  to  identify  instances  where  the  relationship  
between  the  DPRK  and  China  was  depicted  as  going  beyond  friendship  and  more  akin  to  a  
brotherly  or  family-like  connection.  The  word  “fraternal”  —  of  or  like  a  brother  or  brothers  —  
was  often  used  along  with  “sealed  in  blood,”  and  a  luncheon  between  Kim,  Xi,  and  their  wives  
was  described  as  having  a  “happy  family  atmosphere.” 34   
Other  codes  exclusively  found  in  articles  on  Xi  summits  were  “socialism”  and  “past  
leaders.”  Mentions  of  socialism  emphasized  a  common  struggle  of  the  DPRK  and  China  for  the  
socialist  cause.  In  one  instance,  the  KCNA  writes,  “socialism  is  the  unchangeable  core  of  the  
DPRK-China  relationship.” 35   Nine  articles  also  made  references  to  previous  North  Korean  
leaders  Kim  Il-sung  and  Kim  Jong-il  or  “leaders  of  elder  generations”  of  both  countries  as  the  
34  “Kim  Jong  Un  Meets  Xi  Jinping  again,”  Korean  Central  News  Agency,  May  8,  2018.  
35  “Supreme  Leader  Kim  Jong  Un  Hosts  Banquet  for  President  Xi  Jinping,”  Korean  Central  News  Agency ,  
June  21,  2019.  
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bedrock  of  DPRK-China  cooperation  and  friendship.  These  references  indicate  a  promotion  of  
the  traditional  relationship  between  the  DPRK  and  China  and  an  emphasis  on  ideological  
sentiment,  like  previous  scholars  have  found  in  KCNA’s  coverage  of  China. 36   
The  code  “sincerity/honesty”  was  also  found  throughout  coverage  of  the  Xi  meetings.  
Gratitude  was  “heartfelt”  and  actions  were  done  with  the  utmost  “sincerity.”  These  descriptors  
may  have  played  into  North  Korea’s  attempt  to  portray  an  image  of  trustworthiness,  as  the  
failures  of  past  agreements  can  cause  countries  to  call  into  question  North  Korea’s  willingness  to  
actually  follow  through  with  any  deals  that  are  made  in  negotiations.  
Kim’s  meetings  with  Xi  either  immediately  preceded  or  followed  every  single  meeting  
with  Trump.  However,  the  purpose  of  the  Xi  meetings  compared  to  those  with  Trump  and  Moon,  
was  very  different  —  one  that  remains  relatively  unknown  beyond  speculation.  They  did  not  
result  in  any  signed  documents  or  declarations,  only  verbal  promises  of  respect  and  support.  The  
Xi  articles  also  included  descriptions  of  lengthy  orations  on  friendship  and  destiny  and  
sermonizing  on  the  common  cause  of  socialism.  Descriptions  of  the  talks  remained  general,  as  
exemplified  by  this  excerpt  from  an  article  on  their  March  28,  2018  meeting:  
“The  supreme  leaders  of  the  two  parties  and  two  countries  of  the  DPRK  and  the  
PRC  exchanged  views  on  important  matters  including  the  development  of  the  
DPRK-China  friendly  relations  and  the  issue  of  handling  the  situation  of  the  
Korean  peninsula.”  
In  general,  Xi  articles  included  a  large  number  of  what  I  classified  as  “positive  
interactions,”  which  described  interactions  between  the  world  leaders  and  people  involved  in  the 
summits.  Kim  and  Xi  never  just  greeted  each  other;  they  “warmly”  greeted  each  other  or  
exchanged  “warm”  greetings.  They  “warmly”  welcomed,  “warmly”  waved,  “warmly”  
36  Zhang,  “How  North  Korea  Views  China,”  390. 
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congratulated  and  had  “warm”  send-offs.  This  code  was  found  49  times  throughout  the  articles  
covering  the  Kim-Xi  meetings.  
China  is  North  Korea’s  oldest  ally  and  biggest  trade  partner,  and  has  frequently  defied  
international  efforts  to  sanction  the  isolated  country.  North  Korea  has  long  acted  as  a  buffer  state  
between  China  and  the  U.S.  troops  stationed  in  South  Korea,  and  also  serves  as  leverage  when  
negotiating  with  the  U.S.  But  after  a  year  of  frequent  missile  testing,  China  was  frustrated  along  
with  the  rest  of  the  world  —  expressing  those  frustrations  by  voting  in  favor  of  UN  sanctions  and  
issuing  condemnations  of  North  Korea’s  ballistic  missile  launches. 37   The  two  countries  are  also  
party  to  the  1961  Sino-North  Korean  Treaty  of  Friendship,  Cooperation,  and  Mutual  Assistance,  
a  mutual  defense  treaty  that  says  China  will  come  to  North  Korea’s  defense  in  the  event  of  an  
attack.  This  treaty  automatically  renews  every  20  years,  with  the  next  renewal  coming  up  in  
2021.  
Under  these  circumstances,  North  Korea’s  repeated  mentions  of  friendship  and  historical  
ties  may  have  been  an  effort  to  signal  that  they  are  (or  would  like  to  be)  back  in  China’s  good  
graces.  Just  a  year  earlier,  KCNA  criticized  China  in  a  rare  move  accusing  the  country  of  
“dancing  to  the  tune  of  the  U.S.”  and  publishing  a  commentary  saying  “The  DPRK  will  never  
beg  for  the  maintenance  of  friendship  with  China.” 38   However,  on  March  6,  2018,  South  Korean  
National  Security  Advisor  Chung  Eui-yong  announced  that  Trump  had  agreed  to  meet  Kim  by  
37  Joshua  Berlinger,  “China,  Russia  condemn  North  Korea’s  missile  launch,”  CNN ,  Feb.  13,  2017,  
https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/12/asia/north-korea-missile-test-china/index.html .   
38  Don  Melvin  et.  al.,  “North  Korea  Condemns  Lone  Ally  China  Publicly  for  'First  Time',”   NBC  News ,  Feb.  
24,  2017,  
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/north-korea/north-korea-condemns-lone-ally-china-publicly-first-time-n72 
5086 ;  Reuters  Staff,  “North  Korean  media  issues  rare  criticism  of  China  over  nuclear  warnings,”  Reuters ,  
May  3,  2017,  
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-china/north-korean-media-issues-rare-criticism-of-china-ov 
er-nuclear-warnings-idUSKBN17Z1TA .   
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May. 39   Kim  and  Xi’s  first  meeting  took  place  less  than  three  weeks  after  that.  A  seemingly  closer  
relationship  between  North  Korea  and  China  is  beneficial  for  both  countries  when  it  comes  to  
dealing  with  the  U.S.  It  signals  that  North  Korea  has  other  options,  and  Kim  does  not  have  to  
make  a  deal  with  Trump;  China’s  support  strengthens  its  bargaining  position.  China  signals  its  
continued  presence  and  influence  in  the  region.  
  
Meetings  With  Moon  Jae-in  
  
Coverage  of  the  meetings  between  Kim  and  Moon  did  include  mentions  of  economic  
cooperation  and  peace  on  the  Korean  peninsula,  partially  supporting  the  hypothesis.  However,  
these  mentions  are  limited  to  a  few  articles  detailing  the  agreements  made  after  each  summit,  and  
there  are  other  significant  codes  that  contribute  to  a  more  complex  analysis  of  this  set  of  articles.  
KCNA  articles  on  the  Moon  summits  included  coverage  of  signings  of  declarations  and  
agreements,  or  at  least  detailed  descriptions  of  the  topics  discussed:  denuclearization,  NGO  and  
humanitarian  cooperation,  family  reunification,  etc.   
The  “historic”  code  appeared  the  most  frequently  in  KCNA  coverage  of  meetings  
between  Kim  and  Moon.  Everything  was  historic  —  there  was  seldom  ever  a  mention  of  the  
“north-south  summit”  and  “Panmunjom  declaration”  without  the  word  “historic”  in  front  of  it.  
Next  was  the  word  “peace,”  which  was  tagged  with  “peninsula”  14  out  of  the  33  mentions.  Other  
codes  found  in  conjunction  were  “reunification”  and  “denuclearization.”   Note  that  
“reunification”  used  in  this  context  refers  to  family  reunification  and  not  reunification  of  the  
Korean  peninsula.  “Reunification”  was  not  mentioned  in  any  of  the  Trump  or  Xi  articles.  This  
makes  sense  as  the  topic  is  more  of  a  concern  for  those  on  the  Korean  peninsula  and  not  as  much  
39  Chung  Eui-yong,  “Seeking  ‘Peaceful  Resolution’:  Transcript  of  South  Korean  Adviser’s  Remarks,”  
Published  in  The  New  York  Times,  March  8,  2018,  
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/08/world/asia/transcript-south-korea-nuclear-trump.html .   
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policy-wise  for  the  U.S.  and  China.  This  is  a  reflection  of  the  complexity  of  North  Korean  
diplomacy  —  its  fate  is  intimately  tied  to  decisions  by  major  world  powers,  who  all  have  widely  
different  objectives  and  priorities.  At  the  same  time,  it  must  think  of  its  own  people  and  the  
country  it  inhabits  the  peninsula  with.  
Instances  of  the  code  “overcoming  challenges/past  hostilities”  were  found  12  times,  
which  is  not  as  significant  but  still  worthy  of  mention.  In  these  instances,  past  relations  between  
North  and  South  Korea  are  characterized  as  the  following:  “division  and  confrontation,”  
“extreme  hostility  and  confrontation,”  and  “mistrust  and  disputes.”  Some  instances  also  
characterize  the  summits  as  the  start  of  a  new  era  of  relations  between  the  two  countries  and  a  
fresh  start.  
Though  Kim  and  Moon  only  met  three  times  compared  to  Kim  meeting  Xi  five  times,  
KCNA  published  more  total  articles  on  the  meetings  with  Moon  than  the  meetings  with  Xi.  They  
included  detailed  descriptions  of  all  the  activities  the  two  did  together,  such  as  climbing  Mt.  
Paektu,  having  a  luncheon  on  the  shore  of  Samjiyeon  (Lake  Samji),  watching  an  artistic  
performance,  and  planting  a  symbolic  tree  during  both  the  April  2018  and  September  2018  
meetings.  This  may  be  one  reason  why  the  Moon  articles  also  had  a  high  number  of  “positive  
interactions”  that  took  place  during  the  course  of  those  relatively  low-stakes  activities.  
There  were  only  8  instances  of  “success/results”  in  the  Moon  coverage  compared  to  10  in  
the  Trump  coverage  and  13  in  the  Xi  coverage.  The  Moon  summits  seemed  to  be,  at  least  from  
an  outside  observer’s  eye  based  on  the  KCNA’s  own  coverage,  the  most  successful  of  the  three.  
During  the  course  of  the  Kim-Moon  summits,  the  two  leaders  signed  two  joint  declarations:  the  
“Panmunjom  Declaration  on  Peace,  Prosperity  and  Reunification  of  Korean  Peninsula”  in  April  
26  
and  the  “September  Pyongyang  Joint  Declaration.”  Both  were  filled  with  specific  objectives  and  
significant  agreements  about  economic  and  cultural  exchange.   
In  the  Panmunjom  Declaration,  the  two  boldly  declared  they  would  “totally  stop  all  
hostile  acts  against  the  other  side,”  “declare  the  end  of  war  this  year,”  and  that  their  joint  target  
was  to  turn  the  Korean  peninsula  into  a  nuclear-free  zone  through  “complete  denuclearization.”  
It  also  mentioned  frequent  communication  and  cooperation  in  the  future  regarding  NGOs,  family  
reunification,  relinking  railways,  and  participation  in  the  2018  Asian  Games  —  during  which  the  
two  countries  competed  together  as  “Korea”  in  three  sports.  
The  May  meeting  was  largely  skipped  over  by  the  KCNA,  with  only  a  single  article  
published  about  the  meeting.  It  was  held  just  two  days  after  Trump  abruptly  announced  that  he  
would  be  pulling  out  of  the  slated  June  12  Singapore  summit  but  quickly  said  it  might  be  back  on  
again.  What  we  know  about  the  meeting  comes  from  an  address  from  Moon,  who  said  the  two  
discussed  the  upcoming  Kim-Trump  summit  and  made  plans  for  more  high-level  talks  between  
the  two  Koreas. 40   
In  September,  Kim  and  Moon  met  again  as  planned,  signing  the  “September  Pyongyang  
Joint  Declaration.”  This  agreement  included  implementing  a  north-south  joint  military  
committee,  reopening  the  Kaesong  Industrial  Complex  and  Mt.  Kumgang  tourism  project,  and  
making  a  joint  advance  into  the  2020  Summer  Olympics  as  well  as  considering  a  joint  bid  to  host  
the  2032  Summer  Olympics.  Regarding  denuclearization,  Kim  also  agreed  to  shut  down  the  
Tongchang-ri  missile  engine  testing  site  and,  if  the  U.S.  takes  “corresponding  actions  in  line  with  
the  spirit  of  the  June  12  DPRK-U.S.  joint  statement,”  the  Nyongbyon  nuclear  facility.   
40  Moon  Jae-in,  “Full  address  by  South  Korean  President  Moon  Jae  In  on  May  26  inter-Korea  summit,”  
Published  in  The  Straits  Times ,  May  27,  2018,  
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/full-address-by-south-korean-president-moon-jae-in-on-may-2 
6-inter-korea-summit .   
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With  the  exception  of  the  brief  meeting  with  Trump  at  the  Joint  Security  Area  in  June  
2019,  Kim  and  Moon  did  not  have  any  additional  meetings  that  year.  
Many  observers  were  thrilled  with  the  outcome  of  the  May  declaration,  with  one  
declaring  that  “the  risk  of  inter-Korean  conflict  [is]  now  close  to  zero”  and  “this  means  no  more  
nuclear  tests,  missile  launches,  reconnaissance  operations,  or  even  escorted  forays  into  disputed  
waters  by  North  Korean  crab  fishermen.” 41   In  retrospect,  several  of  the  plans  Kim  and  Moon  did  
come  to  fruition.  The  first  family  reunions  since  2015  were  held  in  August  2018,  allowing  88  
elderly  South  Koreans  to  meet  with  family  members  in  the  North  for  three  days. 42   In  November  
2018,  the  first  South  Korean  train  crossed  into  North  Korea  since  2008,  carrying  experts  that  
examined  the  country’s  outdated  rail  system. 43   However,  relations  have  only  deteriorated  since,  
and  in  early  2020,  North  Korea  blew  up  its  joint  liaison  office  with  the  South  in  Kaesong  —  the  
very  office  established  in  the  Panmunjom  declaration  from  April  2018.  North  Korea  had  
withdrawn  from  this  office  in  March  2019  after  a  failed  summit  with  the  U.S.  in  Hanoi.  
For  Kim,  who  announced  in  2018  a  pivot  to  economic  development,  this  time  period  
represented  a  window  of  opportunity  for  engagement  with  South  Korea.  After  the  conservative  
Lee  Myung-bak  and  Park  Geun-hye  administrations,  which  took  harsher  stances  toward  North  
Korean  involving  the  cutting  off  of  economic  and  diplomatic  ties,  the  Moon  administration  
marked  a  return  to  the  Sunshine  Policy  from  the  Kim  Dae-jung  and  Roh  time  period.  Detailed  
description  of  the  agreements  made  and  characterizations  of  positive  interactions  and  success  can  
improve  North  Korea’s  image  and  aid  in  encouraging  further  engagement  with  the  country.  Due  
41  Patrick  Monaghan,  “Don’t  Forget  About  the  Panmunjom  Declaration,”  The  Diplomat ,  May  30,  2018,  
https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/dont-forget-about-the-panmunjom-declaration/ .   
42  Choe  Sang-hun,  “Korean  Families,  Separated  for  6  Decades,  Are  Briefly  Reunited,”  The  New  York  
Times ,  Aug.  20,  2018,  
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/20/world/asia/north-south-korea-family-reunions.html .   
43  “South  Korean  train  crosses  DMZ  into  North  Korea,”  BBC  News ,  Nov.  30,  2018,  
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-46395408 .   
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to  the  often  complicated  optics  involved  with  working  with  North  Korea  —  public  opinion,  
domestic  foreign  policy  apparatus,  international  opinion  —  these  meetings  must  be  worthwhile  
to  continue.  We  know  that  KCNA  does  not  always  report  in  this  kind  of  matter  —  when  the  
Kaesong  complex  was  destroyed,  an  article  wrote  that  the  destruction  of  the  “useless  house”   was  
“in  reflection  of  the  zeal  of  our  enraged  people  to  punish  human  scum  who  challenged  the  
noblest  dignity  and  prestige  of  our  country  and  those  who  sheltered  the  scum,  perpetrators  of  
shuddering  crime.” 44   The  mentions  of  peace  on  the  peninsula  and  warm  relations  between  Kim  
and  Moon  in  the  coverage  of  this  set  of  meetings  are  consistent  with  what  we  believe  were  Kim’s  
objectives  in  these  meetings.  
The  “historic”  and  “overcoming  challenges/past  hostilities”  codes  were  more  unexpected, 
as  my  initial  assumption  was  that  coverage  would  portray  the  two  countries’  engagement  as  
something  that  was  natural  and  expected  as  one  people.  However,  the  repeated  mention  of  the  
historic-ness  of  these  meetings  as  well  as  the  challenges  and  hostile  relations  from  the  past  that  
had  to  be  overcome  certainly  made  them  seem  like  bigger  and  more  significant  achievements.  
The  only  previous  meetings  between  South  Korean  and  North  Korean  presidents  were  in  2000  
between  Kim  Dae-jung  and  Kim  Jong-il  and  2007  between  Roh  Moo-hyun  and  Kim  Jong-il.  It  
may  have  been  a  way  to  signal  that  North  Korea  was  coming  to  the  bargaining  table  once  again  
with  a  fresh  mindset,  but  like  with  the  U.S.,  they  still  come  with  the  baggage  of  past  hostilities  
and  failed  negotiations.   
Meetings  With  Donald  Trump  
Consistent  with  expectations,  KCNA  coverage  of  the  Kim-Trump  meetings  heavily  
emphasized  the  summits  as  the  start  of  a  new  normal  in  DPRK-U.S.  relations  as  well.  Like  the  
44  “Ominous  Prelude  to  Total  Catastrophe  of  North-South  Relations,”  Korean  Central  News  Agency ,  June  
17,  2018.  
29  
Moon  articles,  the  most  common  code  in  the  Trump  articles  was  also  “historic,”  with  the  word  
used  before  mentions  of  “summit,”  “DPRK-U.S  summit,”  “meeting,”  or  “handshakes.”  The  next  
most  common  codes  were  “peace”  (appearing  19  times)  and  “peninsula”  (appearing  21  times),  
with  14  instances  of  the  two  occurring  together.  “Peninsula”  was  almost  always  accompanied  
with  “peace,”  “denuclearization,”  or  “cooperation.”  It  only  appeared  by  itself  3  times.  
The  Trump  articles  only  included  four  instances  of  “positive  interactions,”  with  the  
phrases  “amicable,”  “pleasant,”  and  “warm.”  However,  they  focused  on  the  historical  
antagonistic  relationship  between  the  two  countries  and  overcoming  or  departing  from  them.  
There  were  17  instances  of  the  “overcoming  challenges/past  hostilities”  code,  which  included  
phrases  such  as  “putting  an  end  to  the  decades-long  hostile  relations”  and  “end  the  evil  cycle  of  
confrontation  and  antagonism.”  When  characterizing  the  past  relationship  between  North  Korea  
and  the  U.S.,  these  instances  make  frequent  use  of  the  “hostile”  and  “hostilities.”  However,  like  
with  South  Korea,  there  is  also  emphasis  on  a  new  start,  or  era  to  DPRK-U.S.  relations.  The  
exact  phrase  “new  DPRK-U.S.  relations”  was  used  four  times  in  just  the  one  article  announcing  
the  joint  statement  signed  by  Kim  and  Trump  after  the  June  2018  meeting.  Adding  to  the  
emphasis  on  “historic,”  the  KCNA  acknowledges  the  failures  and  frustration  of  the  past  and  
frames  the  summits  as  an  end  to  all  of  it  —  they  mark  the  start  of  a  new  era.  The  high  number  of  
codes  is  significant  due  to  the  fact  that  the  number  of  articles  analyzed  for  Trump  is  half  that  of 
Moon.  
The  “cooperation”  and  “friendship”  code  were  found  very  few  times  in  the  set  of  Trump  
articles.  The  word  “friendship”  itself  was  never  even  used;  only  “friendly”  made  its  way  in  a  
handful  of  times.   
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The  Singapore  summit  ended  with  a  joint  declaration  with  ambitious,  yet  vague  promises  
for  cooperation  and  peace.  It  reaffirmed  the  commitment  North  Korea  already  made  in  the  April 
27,  2018  Panmunjom  declaration  to  work  toward  the  “complete  denuclearization  of  the  Korean  
peninsula.”  The  joint  declaration  also  included  a  line  on  prisoner  of  war/missing  in  action  
remains  and  repatriation  of  those  already  identified.  However,  declarations  require  plans  to  put  
them  in  action,  and  we  have  not  yet  seen  details  for  the  implementation  of  the  Singapore  
declaration.  
The  summit  in  Hanoi  is  of  special  interest  because  it  ended  early  after  Kim  and  Trump  
could  not  agree  on  a  deal  and  was  labeled  a  “failure”  by  observers. 45   In  press  conference  remarks  
made  at  2:15  p.m.  local  time  on  day  2  of  talks,  Trump  said,  “On  North  Korea,  we  just  left  
Chairman  Kim.   We  had  a  really,  I  think,  a  very  productive  time.   We  thought,  and  I  thought,  and  
Secretary  Pompeo  felt  that  it  wasn’t  a  good  thing  to  be  signing  anything.” 46   Trump  attributed  the  
inability  to  reach  an  agreement  to  North  Korea’s  demand  for  all  sanctions  to  be  lifted.  Regarding  
sanctions,  Trump  said,  “They  were  willing  to  denuke  a  large  portion  of  the  areas  that  we  wanted,  
but  we  couldn’t  give  up  all  of  the  sanctions  for  that.” 47    
However,  the  KCNA  article  “Supreme  Leader  Kim  Jong  Un,  President  Trump  Hold  
Second-day  Talks,”  made  no  mention  of  the  early  breakdown  of  the  talks.  It  concluded  with:  
“The  top  leaders  of  the  two  countries  appreciated  that  the  second  meeting  in  Hanoi  
offered  an  important  occasion  for  deepening  mutual  respect  and  trust  and  putting  the  
relations  between  the  two  countries  on  a  new  stage.  
45  Sue  Mi  Terry,  “Assessment  of  the  Trump-Kim  Hanoi  Summit,”  Center  for  Strategic  and  International  
Studies ,  Feb.  28,  2019,  https://www.csis.org/analysis/assessment-trump-kim-hanoi-summit .   
46  Donald  Trump,  “Remarks  by  President  Trump  in  Press  Conference,”  Feb.  28,  2019,  
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-conference-ha 
noi-vietnam/ .   
47  Trump,  “Remarks  by  President  Trump  in  Press  Conference.”  
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They  agreed  to  keep  in  close  touch  with  each  other  for  the  denuclearization  of  the  Korean  
peninsula  and  the  epochal  development  of  the  DPRK-U.S.  relations  in  the  future,  too,  and  
continue  productive  dialogues  for  settling  the  issues  discussed  at  the  Hanoi  Summit.  
  
Kim  Jong  Un  expressed  his  thanks  to  Trump  for  making  positive  efforts  for  the  successful  
meeting  and  talks  while  making  a  long  journey  and  said  goodbye,  promising  the  next  
meeting.”  
  
The  following  two  days,  the  KCNA  published  detailed  articles  on  Kim’s  meeting  with  the 
president  of  Vietnam.  The  rhetoric  used  in  those  articles  was  quite  similar  to  that  of  the  Xi  
articles,  emphasizing  socialism,  previous  leaders,  traditional  friendship,  and  cooperation.  
Reading  the  KCNA,  one  would  not  even  know  that  the  Hanoi  talks  had  ended  early.  Instead,  
Foreign  Minister  Ri  Yong  Ho  gave  a  statement  to  the  international  media  in  Vietnam,  
contradicting  Trump’s  statement  by  saying  that  North  Korea  was  only  seeking  partial  sanctions  
relief,  not  a  complete  lifting  of  sanctions. 48   They  had  also  offered  to  permanently  halt  nuclear  
tests  in  addition  to  dismantling  the  Yongbyon  nuclear  complex.   
According  to  Elizabeth  I-Mi  Suh,  communication  between  North  Korea  and  the  United  
States  had  taken  place  only  through  state  media  outlets  —  “overlaid  by  ideological  propaganda”  
for  decades,  with  the  first  direct  negotiations  occurring  during  post-Cold  War  engagement. 49   
Since  then,  new  channels  of  communication  have  opened  up,  yet  use  of  media  coverage  and  
indirect  statements  are  still  being  utilized  in  negotiations.  The  Trump  administration  has  been  
egregious  in  its  use  of  media  during  those  summits.  Suh  also  notes  that  state  media  under  the  
Kim  regime  has  been  particularly  optimistic  in  its  media  narratives  since  2018  and  relatively  
cautious  in  mentioning  the  U.S.  administration  by  name  compared  to  its  attacks  on  its  southern 
48  Reuters  Staff,  “North  Korea  offered  proposal  but  U.S.  asked  for  more  at  summit:  foreign  minister,”  
Reuters ,  Feb.  28,  2019,  
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-conference/north-korea-offered-proposal-but-u-s-asked 
-for-more-at-summit-foreign-minister-idUSKCN1QH2BZ   
49  Elizabeth  I-Mi  Suh,  “Making  it  Personal:  Signaling  Between  Donald  Trump  and  Kim  Jong  Un,”  Security  
and  Peace  38,  no.  2  (2020):  88.  
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neighbor.  This  may  indicate  North  Korea  feels  that  it  has  more  leverage  in  its  negotiations  with  
South  Korea  compared  to  the  United  States.  
Finally,  Kim  and  Trump  met  briefly  at  the  Joint  Security  Area  on  June  30,  2019,  
generating  only  one  KCNA  article  of  coverage.  It  was  again  a  historic  meeting,  marking  the  first  
time  a  U.S.  president  had  ever  set  his  foot  in  the  DPRK  across  the  Military  Demarcation  Line.  
Kim  mentioned  “good  personal  relations”  with  Trump,  a  phrase  he  did  not  mention  elsewhere. 50   
And  despite  the  short  and  last  minute  nature  of  the  meeting,  both  leaders  “expressed  great  
satisfaction,”  the  KCNA  reported.  
In  many  ways,  these  summits  were  historic  —  no  U.S.  president  had  ever  met  with  a  
North  Korean  head  of  state.  However,  they  also  came  with  the  baggage  of  nearly  25  years  of  
negotiations  over  North  Korea’s  nuclear  program,  starting  from  North  Korea’s  signing  of  the  
Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Treaty  in  1985,  threats  of  withdrawal  in  1993,  and  negotiations  that  
eventually  led  to  the  October  1994  Agreed  Framework.  Since  then,  sanctions  have  been  removed  
and  re-imposed,  more  talks  have  been  held,  but  North  Korea  does  not  appear  to  be  any  closer  to  
denuclearizing  —  all  the  while  conducting  more  and  more  missile  and  nuclear  tests. 51   Many  
argue  that  the  unsuccessful  negotiations  are  the  result  of  the  failure  to  uphold  their  side  of  the  
bargain  on  both  sides,  but  regardless,  it  still  stands  that  North  Korea  has  only  moved  forward  in  
their  nuclear  development  agenda.  Like  KCNA  coverage  of  the  South  Korean  summits,  the  
emphasis  on  the  historic-ness  of  the  meetings  and  the  accomplishment  of  covering  past  hostilities  
may  have  been  an  attempt  to  signal  North  Korea’s  apparently  newfound  enthusiasm  for  
engagement  with  the  U.S.  and  convince  them  to  continue  that  engagement  beyond  the  first  and  
second  summits.   
50  “Supreme  Leader  Kim  Jong  Un  Has  Historic  Meeting  with  U.S.  President  
Donald  Trump  at  Panmunjom,”  Korean  Central  News  Agency ,  July  1,  2019.   
51  Collins,  “25  Years  of  Negotiations  and  Provocations.”  
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KCNA’s  coverage  echoes  what  Kim  said  himself  during  the  course  of  the  summits.  In  
Singapore,  he  said  via  translator,  “There  will  be  challenges  ahead  but  we  will  work  with  Trump.  
We  overcame  all  kinds  of  skepticism  and  speculations  about  this  summit  and  I  believe  that  this  is  
good  for  the  peace.”  52   He  also  said,  “Today  we  had  a  historic  meeting  and  decided  to  leave  the  
past  behind.  The  world  will  see  a  major  change,”  again  using  the  world  “historic.”  Trump  made  
similar  comments  in  Singapore.  “The  past  does  not  have  to  define  the  future,”  he  said,  and  
claimed  that  this  time  would  not  be  like  past  administrations’  attempts  to  deal  with  North  Korea.  
  
Table  3:  Summary  of  Analysis  
  
52  “North  Korea  summit:  Trump,  Kim  sign  ‘comprehensive’  document  —  live  updates  as  they  happened,”  
CBS  News ,  June  12,  2018,  
https://www.cbsnews.com/live-news/trump-kim-jong-un-summit-north-korea-historic-meeting-singapore-to 
day-2018-06-11-live-updates/.  







March  25-28,  2018  9  Historical  friendship  
Brother-like  relationship  
Positive  interactions  
Socialism/ideological  connection  
May  7-8,  2018  2  
June  19-20,  2018  11  
Jan.  7-10,  2019  2  





April  27,  2018   9  Deals  and  achievements  in  economic  relations  
and  cooperation  
Peace  on  the  peninsula  and  family  reunification  
Overcoming  past  hostilities  
May  26,  2018  1  




June  12,  2018   8  Denuclearization   
Peace  on  the  peninsula  
Overcoming  past  hostilities  
Fresh  start  
Feb.  27-28,  2019  6  






Though  the  themes  found  in  the  KCNA  coverage  was  not  exactly  as  predicted  in  the  
initial  hypotheses  for  Xi,  Moon,  and  Trump,  there  were  distinct  differences  in  the  phrases  and  
types  of  rhetoric  discussed  in  coverage  of  meetings  Kim  had  with  each  world  leader.  Analysis  of  
this  coverage  shows  that  in  an  authoritarian  regime  like  North  Korea,  where  all  media  is  
controlled  by  governmental  authorities,  one  of  the  purposes  of  state  media  can  be  to  support  
foreign  policy  goals  through  coverage  that  is  largely  aimed  at  an  international  audience.  
Additionally,  rather  than  only  contributing  to  North  Korea’s  negotiating  position  toward  the  
country  it  is  meeting  with,  coverage  may  also  have  been  signaling  to  improve  its  position  in  
subsequent  meetings  with  other  world  leaders,  as  seen  with  the  Xi  meeting  held  right  before  
Kim’s  first  meeting  with  Trump.   
KCNA  coverage  of  the  Kim-Xi  meetings  emphasized  China  and  North  Korea’s  historical  
friendship  that  is  more  familial  than  just  regular  friendship.  This  relationship  will  prove  to  be  
important  to  maintain  for  North  Korea  moving  forward,  as  the  country  once  again  moves  down  a  
path  of  nuclear  development  that  may  put  it  at  odds  with  other  countries.  Articles  on  the  
Kim-Moon  meetings  included  details  on  the  plans  for  economic  cooperation  and  development  of  
peace  on  the  Korean  peninsula,  but  also  described  a  lot  of  positive  interactions  and  used  warm  
rhetoric  to  describe  an  air  of  friendliness  between  the  two.  They  also  emphasized  the  historicity  
of  the  summits  between  the  leaders  of  the  two  Koreas  that  have  been  divided  since  1945.  Finally,  
coverage  of  the  Kim-Trump  meetings  was  similar  to  that  of  the  Kim-Moon  meetings  in  its  
emphasis  on  their  unprecedented  nature  and  a  fresh  start  to  the  relationship  between  the  two  
countries.  It  frequently  mentioned  denuclearization,  as  it  has  always  been  one  of  the  most  
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prominent  demands  from  the  U.S.  in  all  negotiations  that  have  taken  place  between  the  two  
countries.  
The  events  after  this  period  of  frequent  meetings  as  well  as  recent  events,  however,  have  
shown  that  regardless  of  what  state  media  is  saying  at  a  given  time,  North  Korea’s  position  is  
constantly  changing,  and  it  is  difficult  to  predict  what  their  goals  are  —  just  like  any  other 
country.  At  the  Eighth  Party  Congress  that  opened  January  5,  2021,  Kim  once  again  called  for  a  
focus  on  nuclear  development,  saying,  “We  must  do  everything  we  can  to  increase  nuclear  war  
deterrence  even  further  as  we  build  the  strongest  military  capability.” 53    
The  KCNA  reported  that  “U.S.  hostile  policy  towards  the  DPRK  has  become  more  
violent,  not  getting  weak”  and  said  “that  a  key  to  establishing  new  relationship  between  the  
DPRK  and  the  U.S.  lies  in  the  U.S.  withdrawal  of  its  hostile  policy  towards  the  DPRK.”  It  also  
described  North  Korea  as  a  “responsible  nuclear  weapons  state.” 54   Regarding  South  Korea,  it  
expressed  an  interest  in  continuing  to  improve  relations  between  the  two  Koreas,  but  accused  the  
south  of  “going  against  the  implementation  of  the  north-south  agreement  on  guarantee  of  peace  
and  military  stability  in  the  Korean  peninsula.”  However,  it  described  North-South  relations  from  
three  years  ago  as  a  “starting  point  of  peace  and  prosperity”  that  they  desired  to  return  to,  but  it  
would  depend  on  the  “South  Korean  authorities’  behavior.”  The  engagement  between  North  
Korea  and  China,  South  Korea,  and  the  U.S.  was  perhaps  not  as  constructive  as  many  had  hoped,  
but  KCNA  reporting  shows  that  at  least  at  that  time,  North  Korea  may  have  been  eager  to  use  
those  opportunities  to  engage  more  with  the  international  community  and  express  their  desire  for  
cooperation.  The  commandeering  of  the  summits  by  the  young  Kim  were  likely  also  useful  for  
53  Sangmi  Cha,  “North  Korea's  Kim  urges  stronger  military  capabilities  as  party  congress  ends,”  Reuters ,  
Jan.  12,  2021,  https://www.reuters.com/article/instant-article/idUSL1N2JO020 .   
54  “Great  Programme  for  Struggle  Leading  Korean-style  Socialist  Construction  to  Fresh  Victory,”  Korean  
Central  News  Agency ,  accessed  at  KCNA  Watch ,  Jan.  9,  2021,  
https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1610502377-14004652/great-programme-for-struggle-leading-korean-st 
yle-socialist-construction-to-fresh-victory/ .   
36  
internal  legitimacy  —  formal  recognition  by  leaders  of  two  of  the  most  powerful  countries  in  the  
world  is  certainly  a  boost  for  his  authority.  Overall  this  study  demonstrates  the  potential  
usefulness  of  English-language  KCNA  output,  and  more  analysis  can  be  done  as  part  of  research  
on  how  state  media  is  used  in  the  authoritarian  system  of  North  Korea.  
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Leader  Dates  Location  #  of  Articles  
Published  
Xi  March  25-28,  2018  Beijing,  China  9  
Moon  April  27,  2018   Inter-Korean  Peace  House  (south  side  of  
Joint  Security  Area)  
9  
Xi  May  7-8,  2018  Dalian,  China  2  
Moon  May  26,  2018  North  Korea  1  
Trump  June  12,  2018   Singapore  8  
Xi  June  19-20,  2018  Beijing,  China  11  
Moon  Sept.  18-20,  2018   Pyongyang,  North  Korea  24  
Xi  Jan.  7-10,  2019  Beijing,  China  2  
Trump  Feb.  27-28,  2019  Hanoi,  Vietnam  6  
Xi  June  20-21,  2019   Pyongyang,  North  Korea  7  
Trump  (and  
Moon)  
June  30,  2019  Freedom  House  (south  side  of  Joint  
Security  Area)  
1  
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Appendix  2  
  
  
Code  used  Explanation  
Meeting  Used  to  sort  the  articles  by  which  meetings  they  were  written  about   
Cooperation  Mentions  of  cooperation,  reconciliation,  unity  
Denuclearization  Mentions  of  denuclearization  or  nuclear-free  peninsula  
Familial  Depiction  of  a  relationship  as  connected  by  blood,  brother-like   
Friendship  Mentions  of  friendship,  friendly  relations   
Historic   Any  mention  of  historic  or  description  of  something  as  being  the  first  
time  in  history  
Metaphor  Use  of  metaphor  or  figure  of  speech  




Phrases  involving  overcoming  past  hostilities,  breaking  past  cycles,  
or  starting  anew  
Past  Leaders  Mentions  of  previous  North  Korean  leaders  (Kim  Il-sung,  Kim  
Jong-il)  or  elder  leaders   
Peace  Mentions  of  peace,  peaceful  
Peninsula  Any  mention  of  peninsula  or  the  Korean  Peninsula  
Positive  Interactions  Interactions  between  Kim  and  the  respective  leaders  that  included  
positive  description  words  such  as  warmly,  warm,  amicable,  pleasant  
Reunification  Any  mention  of  reunification  
Success/Results  Mentions  of  successful  or  phrases  that  indicate  satisfactory  results  
Sincerity/Honesty  Mentions  of  sincere,  heart-felt,  open-hearted,  candid,  honest  
Socialism  Any  mention  of  socialism  or  socialist  
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